


# INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR PRE- AND POST-ELECTION RESPONSE, 2012 / 2013

*DRAFT – Working Document*

Report based on 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Urban Contingency Planning  
& Working Group Consultations

Nairobi Hub

November 2012



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## 1. Introduction

The humanitarian contingency plan is one of four pillars of the overall national contingency plan for election, coordinated by the National Disaster Operation Center (NDOC), which also includes the pillars on security, prevention/early warning and mass casualty. The plan elaborated below is based on previous contingency planning efforts (most notably contingency planning conducted in 2010 in the run up to the constitutional referendum) and consultations at the Nairobi level.

Based on this prevailing context, the humanitarian community, and the Government of Kenya have engaged in humanitarian contingency planning. This CP aims at outlining assumptions, scenarios and potential response arrangements in support of the national response.

This contingency plan has been developed using the outcomes of the Nairobi Hub consultations. The consultations involved the first (26<sup>th</sup> September 2012) and second (7<sup>th</sup> & 8<sup>th</sup> November 2012) Urban Contingency Planning Stakeholders Workshops and Working Group (WG) consultations. The two working groups consisted of the Coordination and Information Management Working Group and the Scenario Building Working Group identified during the first stakeholders workshop and each WG met during the first two weeks of November. The Nairobi hub stakeholders included members of the NDOC, UN and NGO participants (see Annex 1). During the first workshop, the hub members worked on the Nairobi hub TOR and tasked the working groups to take forward the next steps identified. These two working groups met before the 2<sup>nd</sup> workshop to address some of the action points and began some work whose preliminary results were shared at the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting. Objectives of two workshops included the following:

1. Develop and endorse the Nairobi Hub's TOR & Role and Responsibilities
  - Identification of Nairobi sub-hubs & lead agency
  - Map coverage of urban activities and gaps
2. Present and agree on coordination & communication mechanisms
3. Develop pre and post-election violence scenarios and identify response strategies
4. Define next steps – who responsible for what when

## 2. Background

Kenya is scheduled to conduct national general elections on the 4th march 2013. These elections will be the first elections since the adoption of the new Constitution in August 2010 which provides for the devolution government to 47 counties. Elections in 2013 will determine county as well as national governance arrangements.

In the past, Kenya has experienced violence during campaign periods, as well as during and after the elections themselves. This has led to the loss of life, injury, displacement, and destruction of property and livelihoods. Whilst the priority is to support peace building and prevention efforts, previous outbreaks of violence have demonstrated the importance of planning for potential humanitarian response activities.

### 3. Context

The Government declared that at least 4.1 million urban dwellers are extremely food insecure. There is limited information on the status of such key indicators as food security, livelihoods, nutrition and health in the urban slums but it gives an idea on vulnerability in urban Kenya. The urban poor typically reside in slums that are marked by extreme chronic poverty within highly dense populated areas. Urban livelihoods depend on generating income from employment and self-employment, and using earnings to buy food (up to 95% of annual food needs) and non-food items from the markets. There is very minimal production of own cultivation in the urban areas. Households are therefore dependent on the markets and any fluctuation in supply/price has a significant effect on the household's ability to meet their food and non-food needs. In Nairobi, the informal settlements were the center of violence and destruction during the PEV violence in 2007/08 which affected many households directly (violence, injury, displacement) and also indirectly (access to employment, services, food price, food availability, disruption to petty trade, loss of assets etc).

Up to 20% of the urban populations living in informal settlements are chronically vulnerable, either relying on petty trade with minimal returns, or living on the edge of poverty and relying on gifts, begging and other negative coping mechanisms. Populations of each of the informal settlements in Nairobi are made up of different ethnic groups – these include Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda, Nubians and Somalis. All informal settlements have different proportions of different tribes. Ethnicity will play a role in ethnic violence resulting from the elections.

There are challenges in targeting the right people in the Nairobi informal settlements during emergency situations. In an urban context, it is difficult to differentiate extreme chronic poverty and those affected by the election violence. The most vulnerable may not always be the most affected – those owning businesses that are in the better-off wealth groups may lose stock through looting and damage to property. During the emergency, it will be important for Government and international organizations to collaborate and coordinate rapid assessments to assess the impact of the PEV and who is most vulnerable. This can be done through the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessments (KIRA) which is a harmonized tool with on-going capacity building among stakeholders.

### 4. Key Assumptions

- UN and NGO will concentrate their efforts in the prevention and support to peace building but also are to be prepared in case of outbreak of violence.
- Community structures will be willing to support preparedness and response activities.
- The Government of Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross Society will spearhead response in the eventuality of any outbreak of violence, but scale of the crisis may exceed their capacity calling for support from UN/NGO response.
- The HC with OCHA will support the Government of Kenya in the coordination of the UN/NGO response.
- The Nairobi Sub Hubs will coordinate responses to reach the people in need.

- Less than 20 % of the targeted population will be affected by PEV and there will be displacement as result of conflict.
- Security is provided to those engaged in the response, even in a 'lock down' scenario.
- Staff will be available to facilitate response and will take a neutral stance.
- Resources/funds will be available to respond.

## 5. The Humanitarian Scenarios

During the simulation of the scenarios, the hub members took into consideration the different phases/election timeline to define the different circumstances. The most likely and worse case scenarios do not differ significantly on what is assumed will happen – the scenarios are predominantly based on the intensity of the violence and the magnitude impact – the number of people affected – killed, injured, displaced or vulnerable to their disrupted livelihoods. The scenarios are based on whether the election process runs smoothly and there is an undisputed outright winner. It would seem that the increased of armed militia is already building in the informal settlements, and the scale of risk will be determined on how successfully the security forces can control these opportunistic terrorists.

### *Status quo/current*

Based on what is currently happening, the situation shows that there are shifts in political alliances with questions being asked about the eligibility of some potential candidates to run in the elections based on the ICC processes. Currently there may be some under current ethnic mobilization being carried out by the different political parties. There are increased incidents of insecurity and some transition issues, including the uncertainties surrounding the future of the provincial administration structures, police reforms and efforts to bolster police capacity in preparation for the election.

The impacts of these current pre-election (November – December 2012) include:

- ICC suspects may forego their ambitions and back a different candidate leading into the most likely scenario;
- Court declaration / vetting board could declare certain candidates unfit which may result in pre-election violence if the current sentiments by certain communities are anything to go by (e.g. no leader x, no election), and possibly lead to a postponement of the election.

### *Most Likely Scenario*

#### **PRE-ELECTION - now to March**

Based on the current peace and conflict trends in the country the most likely scenario envisages localized episodes of inter-communal conflict, displacement and disruption of basic services. The causes of these will be as a result of multiple factors. These include pre-existing tensions including over resources, disagreements of the implementation of IEBC boundary decision, election campaigning, changes in political alliances and the ICC processes. Tensions could be exacerbated by the increased looting and loss of property, use of small arms and light weapons and the increase in militia activity and emergence of illegal gangs/groups. There are already



indications that people are arming themselves for the predicted election related tension. These tensions could also result in households being unable to carry out their usual livelihood activities.

Closer to elections and the registration process, it is envisaged that a build-up of tension and conflict during the campaigning and election periods could be experienced in the informal settlements in Nairobi. Recruitment and deployment of more security personnel may occur in these settlement areas and other residential areas of Nairobi. The results of the pending integrity court case could have outcomes that trigger more violence. Within this scenario, it is important to consider that the BVR kits could fail during registration, causing confusion and further tension amongst the urban population.

#### **DURING THE ELECTION - March 4<sup>th</sup>**

There may be issues linked to the voting process – voters could be bribed or violence could scare people away and they could choose not to vote. There could be more incidences of Gender Based Violence (GBV) as election tension translates to the household level. Again, in the most likely scenario, the members of the hub were aware of the possible malfunctioning of the BVR kits which could cause anxiety among the population.

#### **POST ELECTION - 5<sup>TH</sup> March – May**

In this most-likely scenario, the stakeholders felt that this phase could include a run-off as a result of no outright winner which would further escalate risk of tensions during the campaigning for a re-run for another 2-4 months. This could involve emergence of more alliances. Tensions will increase and the number of displaced persons could escalate.

The humanitarian impact of these dynamics during the *most likely scenario* could include

- Loss of life and injury
- Localized displacements
- Increased crime, looting and terrorism
- Destruction of property
- Disruption of livelihoods activities with reduced income as people have less access to work and services are affected.
- Issues of food insecurity as during the election, food availability becomes an issue in the market and prices increase.
- Limited market functionality
- Increase in protection related risks such as gender based and sexual violence, the most vulnerable will be women, children and youths.
- Security presence will be increased
- Civic education on the devolution process and nationwide peace building campaigns will have contributed to peace and reconciliation efforts.
- Displaced population and other vulnerable groups will be supported by the local district administration and agencies such as Kenya Red Cross though with some additional support from the international community.
- Health services reduce as health centers become more inaccessible and supplies dwindle.
- Schools and other public likely to be used to house displaced disrupting basic services such as education
- High probability of sporadic clashes or disturbances in urban centers.

Overall, when compared to the PEV in 07/08, it is anticipated that there will be less displacement in PEV hotspots but increased risk in the pre-election period.

### **Preliminary planning estimates**

The Nairobi Hub were unable to access the data from the previous elections to guide there estimation of people in need as a result of the *most likely scenario* pre/post-election violence. It has been estimated for the identified hotspots in the Nairobi informal settlements that the most likely envisages that up to 30,000 – 35,000 people could be in need of humanitarian assistance. The most vulnerable groups would include women and children, elderly, PLWHIV and persons with disabilities.

### *Worst-case scenario*

The worse-case scenario would envisage unsuccessful implementation of electoral reforms opening up the 2013 elections process to abuse and triggering the type of widespread violence seen in the last elections but possibly to a greater extent. An increasing number of people will be affected during the conflict with injuries and possibly deaths. There will be displacement and other vulnerabilities which may go beyond the local capacity. Security response from the Government will be overstretched due to the multiplication of localized conflicts and increased demand for security response.

### **PRE ELECTION - now to March**

In addition to episodes of repeated localized conflict, there will be one or more incidences of mass violence in the run up to, or in the immediate period surrounding the elections. There will be widespread intimidation along tribal/ethnic lines for their votes, as well as political alliances; with additional ethnic bias associated with employment, distribution of aid, access to basic services etc. In the buildup of the elections, more of the population will be arming themselves, with either reactivation of old militia groups or formulation of new ones. These groups could conduct training of group members.

Member of some communities in the informal settlements may choose to migrate out of the hotspot areas, either to their original homes for the voting process, or forced migration due to ethnic tensions.

As transitional issues surrounding the provincial administration remain unresolved, there is a likelihood of increased demonstration amongst chiefs as has been witnessed in the past weeks and a slow-down in government operations related to security in the informal settlements. The delays in the appointment of the Police Inspector General and the proposed preference for a civilian to take up the position could be a source of confusion and poor security in the lead up to the election. This will be exacerbated further by the unresolved issue of police remuneration that has in the past month seen a go slow within the police force. The country will therefore be entering an electioneering period with a compromised security mechanism. The campaign period will witness an escalation of hate speech and incitement of communities against each other contributed mainly due to a weakened security enforcement system as a result of non-implementation of police reforms.

### **DURING THE ELECTION - March 4<sup>th</sup>**

During the elections it will be assumed that election violence will lead to death, injury and displacement to a similar or worse scale seen in 2007/08. During and after the elections there could be accusations of malpractices, voter bribes/intimidations or BVR system malfunction and the elections results may not be endorsed by observers. There could be incidents of violence at polling stations which could discourage the urban communities to vote – either chasing them to their rural homes or not to vote at all. To bolster security during this period, there is likelihood that special police forces or the military may be deployed in areas that are considered to be highly volatile leading to gross violation of human rights. Various terrorist groups will take full advantage of the chaos to commit crimes and create mass violence and panic.

### **POST ELECTION - 5<sup>TH</sup> March – May**

In the worse-case scenario, the number of people displaced will increase with continued violence leading to injury and death. The process of the election re-run will spill over to the post-election phase and could further escalate the risk of tensions during the campaigning for a re-run for another 2-4 months. Tensions will increase and the number of displaced persons will escalate as spontaneous, planned, pre-conceived, pre-meditated violence incidents also increase. This may result in closure of informal settlement borders (“lock-down”) and destruction of infra-structure affecting access. There could be general lawlessness and militia groups aligning themselves with ethnicity and acts of violence for retaliation.

The first hearing of the ICC cases is scheduled for April 2013, irrespective of the election outcome. This might have an impact at the local level with communities turning against each other. The feedback of independent foreign observers on the election process might be regarded as foreign interference especially if the election outcome is not in favor of certain candidates heightening tensions and possibly violence.

The humanitarian impact of these dynamics during a *worse-case scenario* could include:

- Violence will lead to death and injury to a similar or worse scale seen in 2007/08;
- Disruption of the ongoing operation of basic services as displaced populations will flee to places they perceive as being secure including public buildings such as local administration offices, chief offices, churches, schools, and police posts;
- Violence and crime will restrict movement which will entail disrupted livelihoods and access to basic services;
- There could be violent demonstration or incidents of mass violence through incited populations or militia;
- There will be looting, destruction of properties and businesses;
- Market disruption as supplies are either looted or unable to reach the informal settlements/hotspot areas;
- Income from employment will reduce as workers are unable to go to work or lose their jobs as a result of ethnic bias;
- Due to the impacts on livelihoods and access to income (reduced purchasing power), vulnerable households may start adopting negative and adverse coping strategies;
- Protection impacts include large scale gender based violence, and separation of children;



- Initial access could be hampered by road blockades and insecurity – leading to informal settlements’ “lock-down”;
- Disruption of basic services provision such as health with decreased access to available centers/health staff/medical supplies or an overload due to the impacts of the violence.

### **Preliminary planning estimates**

The Nairobi Hub were unable to access the data from the previous elections to guide there estimation of people in need as a result of the *worse-case scenario* pre/post-election violence. It has been estimated for the identified hotspots in the Nairobi informal settlements that the most likely envisages that up to **230,000 – 235,000** people could be in need of humanitarian assistance. The most vulnerable groups would include displaced, women and children, elderly, PLWHIV and persons with disabilities.

## **6. Response Strategies**

Within the urban context, organisations should work towards coordinated inter-agency preparedness. Firstly, the organization needs to look within their organizations to develop preparedness plans facilitating a rapid response<sup>1</sup>. Organizations should pre-position stocks, seek funding and develop proposals/tenders/budgets. Staff capacity and access will become an issue in the most likely and worse case scenarios. They need to liaise with other organizations working in the same areas to develop clear coordinated inter-agency response strategies.

As part of the Nairobi Hub consultations, the members looked briefly into appropriate response strategies for the scenarios. The following matrixes outline relevant interventions with timing and target group suggestions. The response analysis can be developed further over the next 2-3 months and can also act as coordination and planning tools at the Nairobi sub-hub levels (Nairobi Districts with hotspots). Interventions per sector can then be linked to the actor/capacity matrix (see below) to understand who is doing what where (3Ws) and where the gaps may be. The interventions suggested as response options are not currently being implemented across all informal settlements and hotspots, and where they are implemented, the scale of support varies from one informal settlement to the other.

### *Lines and triggers of response*

The first line of response’s mandate lies with the Government and Kenya Red Cross. Then it is the mandate of other INGO and UN agencies to fill the response gaps. Practically, the first line of the response is within the community and religious institutions. Members also mentioned that their ongoing projects will respond to the PEV and these ongoing interventions may be scaled up during the election phases. Response strategies with all actors are critical at Sub-hub level to ensure a coordinated response, outlining who will step in when and cover which sector/s.

The Nairobi Hub members identified the need for an early warning system to be used in the Nairobi informal settlements, with clear indicators/triggers for response. Triggers for response highlighted by the members included, amongst others: the level of violence; number of people displaced; if other lines of response are overstretched; basic services compromised; and election results.

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to Levine, Crosskey, Abdinoor HPN # 71 Nov 2011 ODI ‘System failure’ – Table 1: preparedness

<b>Response Strategies – Status quo</b>				
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Who to target</b>	<b>Who best to implement</b>
<b>Peace building</b>	Community dialogue and sensitization on peaceful co-existence Civic education on electoral process Mapping and monitoring of hotspots	Pre-election: November 2012-March 3 <sup>rd</sup> 2013  Post-election: March-September 2013	Community leaders (village elders) Youth groups Women groups Religious groups Business groups	CBOs/LNGOs Community peace champions FBOs INGOs (CHF) Provincial administration
<b>Food Security</b>	Food assistance (GFD/Cash/Voucher) Livelihood development (skills building, entrepreneurship grants)	On-going	Vulnerable groups i.e. OVCs, PLWA, PWD, elderly etc.	GoK (Ministry of Gender) WFP INGOs/LNGOs (Concern/Oxfam/Goal/MSDP/RGC/Care/Child Fund)
<b>Protection</b>	SGBV (prevention & support for victims) Child protection (safe space for children) Legal aid for SGBV victims	On-going	Vulnerable women and children	UN Agencies/INGOs/LNGOs (Goal, IRC, MSF, UNICEF, IOM, MSDP)
<b>Health</b>	Primary health care services	On-going	Vulnerable groups i.e. OVCs, PLWA, PWD, elderly etc.	GoK( Ministry of Health) CBOs/NGOs/FBOs (MSF, RGC, Provide International, Lea Toto)
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Behaviour change PMTCT Treatment and care (including VCT) Home based care Support groups	On-going	Vulnerable groups i.e. OVCs, PLWA, PWD, elderly etc.	GoK( Ministry of Health) CBOs/NGOs/FBOs (MSF, RGC, Concern, Child fund, Provide International, Lea Toto)
<b>Education</b>	Child sponsorship Girls education support	On-going	Most Vulnerable Children	CBOs/NGOs/FBOs ( RGC, Concern, Child fund, Plan International, World Vision)
<b>Nutrition</b>	Prevention (IYCN) Treatment (OTP/SFP)	On-going	Children under 5 Pregnant and lactating women	GoK (Ministry of Public Health) UN Agencies (UNICEF, WFP) INGOs/LNGOs (Concern, Provide International, Lea Toto, MSF, ACF)
<b>WASH</b>	Water provision Sanitation facilities Hygiene promotion	On-going	Community at large	INGOs/LNGOs/FBOs (Oxfam/Care/Goal)
<b>Land Rights</b>	Shelter Advocacy Legal support from eviction	On-going	Community at large	CBOs/LNGOs/INGOs (Muungano wa Wanavijiji, Kituo Cha Sheria, Pamoja trust, Amnesty, Shelter Forum)

<b>Response Strategies – Most likely</b>				
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Who to target</b>	<b>Who best to implement</b>
<b>Peace Building</b>	Peace clubs in schools Peace messaging through local groups District and community peace committees Dialogues and mediation consultations	Pre-election: November 2012-March 3 <sup>rd</sup> 2013	Youth (artists), women, children, community opinion leaders etc.	CHF, CRS
<b>Protection</b>	Mobile cash transfer to HH for social protection (basic needs) Psychosocial Support (Counseling), Setting up child friendly space (CFS) Referral for tracing and other services Family tracing (information) Tents at the camps	Post-election: March-September 2013	Children up to 18, aged and chronically ill	GOAL, CRS, Child Fund, Concern, UNHCR, MoSSP, UNICEF,
<b>Food Security</b>	Food assistance (GFD/Cash/Voucher)	Post-election: March-September 2013	IDPs and other vulnerable groups	WFP, MoSSP, GOAL, WV
<b>Nutrition</b>	Delivery of blanket supplementary feeding to infants and young children, and pregnant & lactating women. Establish feeding centers	Post-election: March-September 2013	Under 5, pregnant & lactating mothers	Concern, UNICEF
<b>WASH</b>	Sanitation Access - mobile toilets and NFIs (sanitary pads for women, water containers etc.). Water provision and water purification	Post-election: March-September 2013	Displaced population in camps	GOAL, Concern
<b>Health</b>	MED and mental health services for Continuity of drug supply for chronic diseases Stabilization centers Set up clinics Respond to disease outbreak	Post-election: March-September 2013	Displace persons, GBV survivors, patients, under 5s,	MSF, Concern

<b>Response Strategies – Worse-case</b>				
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Who to target</b>	<b>Who best to implement</b>
<b>Protection</b>	Registration of displaced household Identification, tracing and reunification of unaccompanied minors Sensitization on protection Deliver trauma counselling support Establish safe spaces for children Establish safe spaces for GBV	Within 24 hours of displacement and/or violent conflict	Displaced & other vulnerable groups	GOK, KRCS, UNHCR, IOM  UNICEF, Save the Children, Plan International, other INGOS and FBOs UNWomen, UNFPA, INGOS, woman GBV working group in Nairobi, FEDA, Cradle, CWSK
<b>Food Security</b>	Emergency food assistance to places of displacement/assembly points Rapid assessment on food availability Food voucher system through existing vendors/or engage new vendors Distribution of cooking fuel	Within 24 hours of violence/displacement Within 7 days of onset of emergency	Displaced communities prioritizing families with children, elderly, disability	GoK (Ministry of Gender) KRCS WFP through partners INGOs/LNGOs (Concern/Oxfam/Goal/MSDP/RGC/Care/Child Fund)
<b>Nutrition</b>	Delivery of blanket supplementary feeding to infants and young children, and pregnant & lactating women. Establish feeding centers	Within 24 hours through feeding centers	Infants & young child (under 5), pregnant and lactating woman	GoK (Ministry of Public Health) UN Agencies (UNICEF, WFP) INGOs/LNGOs (Concern, Provide International, Lea Toto, MSF, ACF)
<b>WASH</b>	Water provision/water trucking Establish mobile water kiosks Mobilize mobile toilets to points of displacement Distribute water storage facilities and chlorination tablets	Within 24 hours of displacement and/or violent conflict	General population Displaced population Households that have lost their assets, vulnerable households	INGOs/LNGOs/FBOs (Oxfam/Care/Goal)
<b>Health</b>	Primary health care services		Vulnerable groups i.e. OVCs, PLWA, PWD, elderly etc.	GoK( Ministry of Health) CBOs/NGOs/FBOs (MSF, RGC, Provide International, Lea Toto)
<b>Shelter/NFIs</b>	temporary shelter provided where displacement NFI distribution	within 24 hours of displacement	displaced communities prioritizing families with children, elderly	UNHCR, KRCS, IOM, UNICEF, INGOS and local NGOs including FBOS
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Continued delivery of supplementary feeding to people on ARVs		Vulnerable groups i.e. OVCs, PLWA, PWD, elderly etc.	GoK( Ministry of Health) CBOs/NGOs/FBOs (MSF, RGC, Concern, Child fund, Provide Int., Lea Toto)

## 7. Nairobi Hotspots

District	Informal settlement/Hotspot
Langata	Kibera/Langata
Embakasi	Mukuru Dandora
Pumumuani	Majengo Kiambiu
Kasarani	Mathare Korogocho Kariobangi, Huruma Dandora
Westlands	Kawangware
Starehe	Mathare

## 8. Targeting

The challenge within an urban context is targeting the right people. For a rapid onset crisis like conflicts, Oxfam suggests that the targeting method should focus on geographical and categorical criteria for immediate response. Within the Nairobi context, informal settlements can be divided into zones (about 200 households), usually based on ethnicity groupings. This zoning/mapping is carried out by community leaders. The targeting is usually a blanket approach in the first phase of crisis response – for example, all the affected in a locality, staying in camps, shelter, displaced etc. Means testing is not advised in a rapid onset targeting as it takes too much time and community based targeting is not advised especially in a conflict scenario. During any conflict, it is important to keep an eye on women and children, as well as minority communities to check they are not left out.

### Assessments

The Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment (KIRA) has been developed to assess the situation during the PEV. Members of the Hub will have an opportunity to be trained in this joint assessment tool. The tool is used to collect primary data, giving a snap shot of the situation to inform the need at the initial phases. Although organisations prefer to trust their own information during a crisis, this joint assessment approach, if done in a credible way by all members, will produce credible data and reduce the need to carry out separate assessments.

Lead organization of the Sub-hubs could coordinate the multi-agency assessment, or designate a Sub-hub assessment lead.

## 9. Coordination and information management

### Coordination

The Coordination and Information Management Working Group defined how the Nairobi Hub will manage information collection and dissemination and coordination mechanisms. During a response, humanitarian actors including Government, Kenya Red Cross, International NGOs and Local NGOs need to work together, ensuring that the people in need are being targeted with response that cover the sectors and are appropriate within the PEV context. There will need to be coordination mechanisms at District (Sub-hub) levels, ensuring that existing urban programmes continue during the PEV period and have the capacity to scale up. Additionally, it will be important to identify gaps in response and identify organisations that have the resources and capacity to support response endeavors to cover all sectors and the scale of the response required.


For effective coordination and management of information, the Nairobi Hub will need data on:

- Hot spot area: based on the 2007/8 experience, but could include new hotspots;
- Who has been affected (including number of people/ categories of people), by what & extent of impact
- Who is doing what and in which area and identifying the gaps;
- Proposed assembly points or rapid response sites, operating basic services;
- Clear communication and coordination with the Government and Kenya Red Cross, to develop a response strategy and identify areas where they need support.

It will also be important that key information is provided to the community during the pre/post election period. The communities will need to know:

- Hot spot areas: where to avoid & nature of shock;
- Assembly points;
- Where they can access basic services in the event of a disaster (shelter, health, food, information on missing persons).

### Information flows





### *Sources of Information and timing*

There are various sources of information for updates on the situation in the informal settlements. Sources will include, amongst others: Government Agencies e.g. NDOC, Provincial/District Administration, Kenya Police, IEBC; Civil Society Organisations - Hub & Sub-Hub members; Community members - youth groups, community health workers, social workers, village elders, chiefs, leaders etc.; Religious groups e.g. churches, Mosque; and media.

### *Dissemination of information*

The frequency of the information on the progress of the election and incidents of insecurity in the informal settlements will vary depending on which phase:

Pre-election: October 2012-December 2012: Monthly updates

Pre-election: January 2013 –February 2013: Bi-weekly

Election: early March: Daily updates

Post-election: March 2013 – May 2012

Information will be disseminated via mobile phone, web-sites, hotlines and email and social media; using existing structures such as local TV channels and broadcasting on FM radio stations. Another alternative is using the community meetings (*barrazas*) to get information to the community. However, this channel needs to be handled carefully, with sensitivity and measures to ensure the messages do not cause panic. Organisations need to decide on which communication should be shared with which stakeholders and filter it accordingly. These information channels will link into the NDOC mechanisms such as vetted security information through the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) to provide and vet information. There will be Government NDOC sitreps which should provide regular updates and access to the NDOC hotline: 020-2212386 (manned 24hrs) and email/website: [nationaldisasterops@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:nationaldisasterops@yahoo.co.uk) & [info@ndockenya.org](mailto:info@ndockenya.org).

At this level, the Nairobi Hub recognized the importance of reactivating the District Disaster Management Committees to link the sub-hub members to information networks and security forces, as well as the coordination of response at Hub level and Sub-hub level.

## 10. Mapping of actors existing capacity in Nairobi

WHO	WHAT	SECTOR	WHERE	STATUS
<b>CHF International</b>	Kenya Tuna Uwezo	Capacity Building, Conflict Mitigation and Management	Nairobi	Ongoing
<b>Concern Worldwide</b>	Most Vulnerable Children access and complete primary education	Education, HIV	Korogocho, Mukuru, Mathare	Ongoing
<b>Legal Resources Foundation</b>	Enhancing Community and School Managers' participation in child protection in Korogocho	Protection, Education	Korogocho	Ongoing (Ends December 2012)
<b>Catholic Relief Services</b>	Nairobi Peace Building Project	Security, Peace building	Kariobangi, Mathare	Ongoing
	Livelihoods	Early Recovery/Emergency	Kariobangi, Mathare	Completed
<b>COOPI</b>	Food Security and Environment Protection	Agriculture, Environment, Food, WASH	Huruma, Mathare	Completed
	Environment Protection	Environment	Huruma	Ongoing
	Cash Transfer	Multi-Sector	Mathare	Completed
	Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition	Nutrition	Makadara	Completed
<b>Plan International, Inc</b>	Right to Quality Health, Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation	WASH	Kwale, Kilifi, Tharaka, and Machakos	Ongoing
	Right to Child Protection and Inclusion	Protection/Inclusion, Gender	Embakasi, Kawangware	Ongoing
	Right to Quality Education	Education	Embakasi, Kawangware	Ongoing
<b>GOAL-Ireland (Kenya)</b>	Urban Programme	Health, WASH	Mukuru, Korogocho/Kariobangi	Ongoing
<b>UNHCR</b>	IDP Protection Monitoring Project with KNCHR Implementing on behalf of UNHCR	Protection (IDPs)	National	Ongoing

	Coordination of the Protection Working Group on Internal Displacement	Protection	Nairobi	Ongoing
<b>Redeemed Gospel Church</b>	Social Transformation (HIV/AIDS)	Health	Korogocho, Nairobi	Ongoing
	Youth and Children	Education	Kasarani, Starehe, Korogocho, Mathare	Ongoing
	Health Project (Treatment, Prevention, HIV/AIDS)	Health	Kasarani, Starehe, Huruma, Mathare, Korogocho	Ongoing
	Nutrition Project or Under 5	Nutrition	Kasarani, Starehe, Huruma, Mathare, Korogocho	Ongoing
	Advocacy Programme	Protection	Kasarani, Starehe, Huruma, Mathare, Korogocho	Ongoing
	Relief	Food	Nairobi	When need arises
	Livelihood Program	Capacity Building	Kasarani, Starehe, Huruma, Mathare, Korogocho	Ongoing
	T.O.T.	Capacity Building	Nairobi	Ongoing
	Disaster Response	Emergency	Kasarani, Stareheh	When need arises
<b>Mukuru Slums Development Projects</b>	Social Support	Multi-Sector	Makadara/Embakasi	Ongoing
	Mukuru Waste Management	Environment	Makadara/Embakasi	Ongoing
	Halfway House Rehab Centre	Protection	Makadara/Embakasi	Ongoing
	Mukuru Skills Training Centre	Education	Makadara/Embakasi	Ongoing
<b>Kutoka Network</b>		Economic empowerment	Korogocho	Ongoing
<b>Resettlement Support Centre Africa</b>	Resettlement Support Centre Africa	Support	Westlands	Ongoing
<b>Childfund Kenya</b>	Orphan and Vulnerable Children	HIV/AIDS and Economic Empowerment	Kibera	Ongoing
	Orphan and Vulnerable Children	WASH and early childhood	Kibera, Mukuru	Ongoing

		development		
<b>GOAL-Ireland (Kenya)</b>	HIV/AIDS	Health	Makadara, Kasarani	Ongoing
	Youth Friendly Services (YFS)	Health	Makadara, Kasarani	Ongoing
	Reproductive Health	Health	Makadara, Kasarani	Ongoing
<b>Pamoja Trust</b>	No Title	Capacity Building, WASH, Environment, Housing and Land tenure, Agriculture (Urban)	Nairobi	Ongoing
<b>World Vision Kenya</b>	Rivuta, Soweto, and Kariobangi Economic Livelihood Projects	Capacity Building, Food, Coordination and Support services, Education	Rivuta, Kariobangi, Soweto-Kayole	Ongoing
	Kariobangi Waste Mangement and Youth Empowerment Projects	WASH, Capacity Building, Health, Education	Kariboangi	Ongoing
<b>Solidarites International</b>	ERF - Urban Agriculture	Agriculture	Mukuru, Nairobi	Completed
<b>MSF-Belgium</b>	Kibera-Primary Health Care Programmes	Health (HIV/TB & SGBV)	Kibera	Ongoing
	Emergency Preparedness	Health	Nairobi (West)	Ongoing
	Mathare Blue Horse	Health, Gender (HIV/TB/MDR TB/SGBV)	Mathare, Eastleigh, Huruma, part of Eastland	Ongoing
	Coordination	Response to emergencies (Violence, Epidemics)		Ongoing
<b>UNAIDS</b>	HIV Preparedness (With IOM/MAC)	Health, Multisector		Starts October 2012
<b>UNICEF</b>	High Impact Nutrition Interventions in 80% of Health Facilities in partnership with MoPHS, MoMs, Concern WW & IPs	Nutrition	All of Nairobi	Ongoing
		Protection	Dagoretti in partnership with AMREF and Kibera in partnership with AVSI	Ongoing

<b>UNICEF, UN Women and Habitat; with the implementing partner being Africa Youth Trust</b>	Safe & Friendly Cities for all	Protection	Kibera, Eastleigh, Mukuru and Mathare	Ongoing for 5 years
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## 11. Annexes

### Annex 1 - List of Nairobi Hub members (participants of 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> workshops)

Joseph Odep	AMREF
Edward Macharia	Care International
Wilson Kiprono	RSC Africa
Evans Ayiecko	Redeemed gospel church
Yacob Yishak	Concern Worldwide
Kassim Lupao	Concern Worldwide
Catherine Mwangi	Concern Worldwide
Bessie Nikhozi	Concern Worldwide
Victor Odera	Concern Worldwide
Ivy Ndiewo	Concern Worldwide
Anne O'Mahony	Concern Worldwide
Wendy Erasmus	Concern Worldwide
Samwel Jomo	Legal Resources Foundation
Samunanjali Mohanty	OXFAM
Colin Christensen	Poverty action
Anne Muthoni	Mukuru Slums Development Project
Pamela Onduso	Pathfinder International
Patrick Lavand'Homme	UN OCHA
Peter Njoroge	Goal
Emmanuel Oguttu	Goal
Andrew Nzimbi	Save the Children UK
Angeline Wambanda	IOM
Guilhem Molinie	MSF - B
Edward Kiema	NDOC
Gary Jones	UNAIDS
Peter Wanjau	CHF International
Kumar Chandiramani	MSF - B
Joseph Matere	FAO Kenya
Maureen Kamenderi	Plan International
Josephene Ndungu	Plan International
Loice Abende	COOPI
John Okanga	CHF International
Wycliffe Nsheka	Finn Church aid
Alfred Agengo	Child Fund Kenya
Raymond Cheruiyot	Child Fund Kenya
Hennequin William	MSF - B
Michael Kinyanjui	World Vision Kenya
Pauline Sande	Goal Ireland Kenya



Samuel Mwangi	Redeemed Gospel church
Lorraine Ombech	UNHRC
Kamukam Ettyang	Pamoja Trust
Pablo Arudl	Solidarites International
Joseph Riwongole	CRS Kenya
Rose Njagi	UNICEF
Esther Njuguna	CARE Kenya
Hellen Akoth	Goal
Lilly Schofield	Concern Worldwide
Anne Njuguna	Child Fund Kenya
Roberts Sila	OXFAM
Mathew Mcilvenna	WFP
Robert Nyarangi	Child Fund Kenya
Elizabeth Muthoni	OXFAM
Salaton Leteipan	UNHCR
Lucy Dickinson	UN OCHA
Kimberly Tilock	CHF
Amina Abdulla	Concern Worldwide

## Annex 2 – Nairobi Hub TOR and roles & responsibilities

1. Provide **coordination** during the pre and post-election periods (including during a response) through:
  - Acting as the custodian of 3Ws and regularly updating the same
  - The establishment of sub-hubs by geography (linking into existing coordination mechanism), to be led by a member with strong presence in each area/district
  - Providing secretariat support to the various working groups established (or to be established) within the hub
  - Supporting members to develop a contingency plan for the hub and regularly updating the same
  - Coordination of rapid assessments with support from the OCHA/ACAPS
  - Ensuring representation of the hub in national level coordination structures for the humanitarian pillar as well as other pillars established within the National CP process
  - Coordinating with GoK and other actors in the area (including first line response organizations on ground) in the event of a response and identifying response gaps that can be filled by member organizations of the hub.
  
2. Act as focal point for **information** gathering and dissemination particularly through:
  - Acting as a contact point with OCHA/NDOC/other Hubs/Clusters and a communication network
  - Receive analyzed information from the Sub-Hubs and hub members for dissemination to members and national coordination structures

3. Serve as a point of convergence and **resource custodian** where:
  - Member organisations can pool resources to be disbursed by focal point based on contingency planning
  - Member organizations undertake joint resource mobilization through the development of joint/umbrella proposals

#### *Nairobi Hub members: roles & responsibilities*

- Actively participate in the hub coordination activities through regular attendance of meetings, provision of information, updates and adherence to set timelines for submission of information and updates
- Provide information on a regular basis to the hub focal point on the situation in their respective areas based on the information needs defined by the information working group
- Disseminate information received through the hub (related to the response/and or service delivery points in the event of a disaster) to the communities and other actors in their respective areas
- Undertake a response in their respective areas based on what has been outlined in the contingency plans and the needs/gaps on ground and ensure the focal point is aware of the response and target group

#### *Roles of NDOC, NCC, Kenya Red Cross, NGOS, UN*

It is important to define how UN and NGOs will feed into the emergency response during planning before the emergency. KRCS is ideally the 1<sup>st</sup> line of response. In the event that they do not have the capacity to respond (geographical, scale of need), the Nairobi hub members will need to engage with KRCS and define the response needs/protocol within the planning phase (December 2012 – March 2013).

#### **Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP):**

- Coordinate the formulation and implementation of Policies and Institutional Framework for Disaster Management
- Coordinate the mobilization of resources for Disaster Management
- Coordinate all stakeholders in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
- Monitoring and Evaluation of the Disaster Management Programme

#### **Crisis Response Center (CRC):**

#### **NDOC:**

- Coordination at national level (including logistics)
- Translation of NDSC decisions into action by relevant
- Planning and needs/resource prioritization
- Review of plans and evaluation of implementation
- Preparation of Sitreps

**KRCS<sup>2</sup>:**

- First responder in the event of an emergency
- Undertake rapid assessments and risk analysis
- Co-lead key clusters e.g. Shelter/NFI
- Coordination of specific emergency response
- Information sharing for purpose of planning and response with various stakeholders including government

**UN/NGOs:**

- Support coordination efforts of government at the various levels
- Support risk analysis and assessments
- Fill in response gaps in areas where an emergency response has been initiated
- Information sharing for purpose of planning and response with various stakeholders including government

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<sup>2</sup> This needs to be defined during meetings between the Kenya Red Cross. As one of the first lines of response, the organisation needs to participate in the coordination at sub-hub level to develop a response strategy.

### *Sub-hubs: District level coordination*

<b>District</b>	<b>Informal settlement/Hotspot</b>	<b>Lead<sup>3</sup></b>
Langata	Kibera/Langata	MSF-B
Embakasi	Mukuru Dandora	GOAL
Makadara	Mukuru	Oxfam
Pumwani	Majengo Kiambiu	CHF
Kasarani and Starehe	Mathare Korogocho Kariobangi, Huruma Dandora	CHF
Westlands	Kawangware	MSF-F

### *Sub-hub Leads – roles and responsibilities*

- Represent the hub at the district coordination mechanisms
- Provide information on a regular basis to the hub focal point on the situation in their respective areas based on the information needs defined by the information working group
- Disseminate information received through the hub (related to the response/and or service delivery points in the event of a disaster) to the communities and the relevant stakeholders in their respective sub-hubs
- Liaising with faith based institutions, community based organizations and other NGOs in their respective areas to ensure that they are aware of and participate in coordination mechanisms at the sub-hub (district) level
- Liaising with local Kenya Red Cross offices for purposes of information sharing and response coordination.

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<sup>3</sup> The sub-hub leads need to be confirmed and roles agreed

### Annex 3 – Approximate figures of people who could be affected by PEV

District	Hotspot	Ethnic groups	Support	Population figures <sup>4</sup>	At risk %	At risk pop	Most likely %	affected	all at risk	Assumptions
								Most likely pop	Worse case	
Nairobi West	Kibera	60% Nubians	60% ODM	92,802	40%	37,121	5% of Luo 20%	928	37,121	20% of the Luo population will be impacted by predominant militia but only 5% of Luo population will require assistance.
		20% Luo								
		10% Kikuyu								
		10% Others								
Embakasi	Mukurus	60% Kikuyu	60% TNA	296,605	30%	88,982	5% directly affected	14,830	88,982	Homogenous community with Kisii and Kamba minorities, most are casual employees and petty traders will pre-empt adverse impacts.
		20% Kamba								
		10% Kisii								
		10% Others								
Nairobi East	Kiambio	80% Kikuyu	80% TNA	70,239	20%	14,048	10% directly affected	7,024	14,048	Due to community homogeneity impact will be confined to 10% Luo population.
		10% Luo								
		10% Others								
Kasarani	Mathere Valley	40% Luo	40% ODM	138,625	50%	69,313	5% along border	6,931	69,313	Conflict will be along Luo/Kikuyu communities' boundary buffer zones which will affect approximately 5% of the total population.
		40% Kikuyu	40% TNA							
		10% Luhya								
		10% Others								
Pumwani	Majengo	40% Mijikenda		17,264	10%	1,726			1,726	Characterised by largely Muslim community with no history of election related violence.
		30% Luo								
		20% Others								
		10% Somali								
Westlands	Kawangware	50% Luhya	60% ODM	118,696	20%	23,739			23,739	The predominately Luo/Luhya ethnic group have no history of urban inter-ethnic conflict.
		20% Luo								
		20% Kikuyu								
		10% Others								
				<b>TOTAL POP</b>		<b>AT RISK</b>		<b>LIKELY</b>	<b>WORSE CASE</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>734,231</b>		<b>234,928</b>		<b>29,713</b>	<b>234,928</b>	

<sup>4</sup> Please note that these figures are based on rough population figures from different sources but currently mainly from the 2009 Census with a 3% annual growth rate.